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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do the Constitutions of the United States and Utah

Prohibit Congressf The State of Utah and Salt Lake City from
Interfering with or Preventing reception of Satellite Radio and
Television transmissions by means of a Satellite Antenna by means
of exercise of police powers or
2.

any other means?

Does the Salt Lake City Ordinance Title 51 differentiate

between types of Antennas and operate to interfere with or prevent
reception of Satellite Radio and Television Transmission Signals?
3.

Are the Utah Circuit Courts and the Utah Court of

Appeals Unofficial/ Unlawful and Unconstituional and void?
4.

Are all Acts of Utah legislation during the years 1975

through 1989 Unofficial, Unconstitutional and void?
5.

Are all appointments requiring advise and consent of

the Utah Senate void for the years 1975 through 1989, including
the appointments to the circuit, district, appeals and supreme
courts of Utah,

because the Senators elect for those years

all failed to file their oaths required by the Constitutions of
and laws of the United States and Utah?
6.

Was due process of Law denied to defendant/petitioner?

7.

Was effective assitance of counsel denied petitioner?

8.

Is due process of law being denied petitioner because

Michael D. Zimmerman, I. Daniel Stewart, Gordon R. Hal, R. Paul
Van Dam, Edward T. Alter, Tom L. Allen, W. Val Oveson, Norman H.
Bangerter and the members elect of the Utah legislature all did
fail to file their required oaths of office within sixty days
of the commencement of their respective terms of office, leaving
each office vacant as a matter of law?

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The unofficial Utah court of appeals entered an order
of affirmance on the 29th day of November 1989.

There has been

no rehearing.
Utah Code Annotated Title 78, Section 2-2(5) was enacted
by an unofficial legislature and is unconstitutional and void.
There is no valid statutory authority for the supreme court of
Utah to grant petitions for writs of certiorari.

All legislation

from 1975 through 1989 is unconstitutional and void.
CONTROLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS
United States Constitution:
Article I, Section 8
Section 9
Section 10
Article VI
Article VII
Amendment I
Amendment VI
Amendment XVI
Utah Constitution:
Article I
Sections:
7
15
Article IV
Section:
10
2

Article VIII
Article XXIII
Agency Rules:
47 CFR 25.104
United States Statutes:
1 Stat 23
1 Stat 246
18 USCA 2, 3, 4, 8, 241, 242, 331, 332, 333, 334, 371,
471 , 1367, 1962, 1983.
Utah State Statutes:
Utah Code Annotated:
Sections: 25-5-4; 52-1-2? 52-2-1;.- 61-1-1;
76-1-301; 76-8-203; 76-10-1602;
76-10-1603; 78-2-3.
Salt Lake City Ordinances:
Sections:

1.12.030

(1988)

Title 51:
Sections:

51-1-2; 51-5-6; 51-5-7; 51-8-1;
51-5-23.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant/petitioner, Bruce P. Palmer was ordered
to remove a satellite antennae from his property at 933
Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah on December 17, 1987.
He challenged the power of Salt Lake City to issue such an order
and was cited by Craig Spangenber for having a satellite antenna
in "front yard" on January 6, 1988.

Trial was held on July 5,

1988 in an unofficial third circuit court where an unofficial
3

jury returned a guilty verdict for an unauthorized structure
in a front yard setback.

Judgment was entered July 5, 1988 and

sentence was imposed, a 200 dollar fine and 30 days in the Salt
Lake County Jail.

A Notice of appeal was filed on July 15, 1988.

A docketing statement was filed, a transcript obtained and briefs
were filed by both parties.

Oral arguments were presented on the

28th day of November 1989 and an Order of Affirmance was issed
by the unofficial appeals court on 29 November 1989,

this is

a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Order of Affirmance
on the grounds that both the trial and appeals court are unofficial
and unconstitutional and due process has been denied.
RELELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Palmer has a satellite antenna on his nonconforming
parcel of land in a nonconforming yard in front of the building
on that 1501.25 square foot parcel of land which has none of
the required front, back or side yards required by the Salt Lake
City Code and his property is not subject to section 51-5-6 and
51-5-7 which only apply to required yards having 4,000 or more
square feet for a single family dwelling.
Mr. Palmer was denied his business license because he would
not remove the satellite antenna.

Mr. Palmer's attorney, Don L.

Bybee, subpoenaed no witnesses and failed to file the memorandum
of law ordered by Floyd H. Gowans to be filed in support of the
defendants motion to dismiss, thus denying effective assistance
of counsel.

Admission of 47 CFR 25.104 and 18 USCA 1367 and

other relevant evidence of the applicable lav; were denied during
the trial, and were ignored on appeal by use of a Rule 31 hearing
and subsequent^ order ,on appeal, affirming the conviction.
4

ARGUMENTS
1.

The Constitution of the United States prohibits Congress

from making any law respecting the establishment of religionf or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

U. S. Const. Amendment I.

The Utah Constitution

also prohibits any law to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press.

Therefore neither Congress nor Utah has

the power to prevent Mr. Palmer or any other citizen from exercise
of his inalienable rights to receive free speech or have access to
the free press or to exercise his religion by means of a satellite
antenna.

His right to freedom of assembly is also infringed if

Salt Lake City can impose a restraint or abridgement upon his
rights protected under the U. S. And Utah Constitutions.

Reception

of satellite transmissions of free speech, press and religion is
a protected right under both constitutions.

The Salt Lake City

Ordinance is therefore no law under the U. S. and Utah Constitutions
and is a is an abuse of police powers, SLC Code 51-5-6 and 7 are
Void as a matter of law and are unconstitutional.
2.

The Salt Lake City ordinance 51-5-6 mentions only one type

or kind of antenna and prohibits all other kinds since it does not
specifically mention any other type and is therefore preempted by
47 CFR 25.104, which was adopted because cities were attempting
to deprive people of their right to receive free speech and press
and religion.

Red lion Broadcasting vs. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

Van Meter v. Township of Haplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988).
Maplewoods back yard only ordinance was declared preempted.
5

In Red Lion, supra, it was clearly stated by the court
that the rights of the listening and viewing public are paramount.

Salt Lake City's ordinance and Mr. Palmers prosecution

under it are for the express purpose of denying him access to
free speech and free press and to deprive him of religion by
construing municipal police powers to included the power to
interfere with and prevent public broadcast from being heard
or seen by Mr. Palmer by means of satellite equipment on his
property, thus depriving him of his right to own and control
property under the Utah Constitutionand the U. S. Constitution
Amendment VI, and denying equal protection of the FCC Preemption
order and denying
3.

him constitutional rights.

The Utah Circuit courts and the Utah Court of Appeals

are Unofficial because the Utah Senate has failed to qualify for
office by each Senator-elect failing to file his or her oath of
office pursuant to the United States Constitution Article VI,
I Stat 23, Utah Constitution Article IV, Section 10, and Utah
Code Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1, and 76-8-203 which
require the oath to be take and subscribed and filed and recorded
before entering upon the duties of any legislative, executive
or judicial office of the State of Utah.

As of June 30, 1989,

not a single oath of office for any senator-elect from 1975 to
1989 was filed in the office of the Secretary of State or any
other authorized office as required by 52-1-2.
4.

All acts of the Utah legislature were and are void for

the years 1975 through 1989 because none of the Senators-elect
filed their oaths of office for those years and every act of
legislation during those15 years is the result of an unofficial
act.

5.

All appointments requiring the advice and consent of the

Utah Senate are void for the years 1975 through 1989 for the
failure of the senators-elect to file the required oaths of
and all senate offices became vacant as a matter of law 60 days
after the terms began and all acts were unofficial and all
consent to appointments failed on that ground and under the
Constitutional and statutory provisions cited in argument 3.
6.

due process has been denied the defendant/petitioner

because the the trial courts and the court of appeals were not
official courts of the state of Utah and the judges thereof had
not been duly appointed by a qualified senate therefore the
whole Utah bar is disqualified and effective assistance of counsel
is impossible under those conditions and the conduct of the courts
is criminal under the provisions of 76-8-203, and every exercise
of judicial power in Utah is unofficial* unconstitution an void
for the years 1977 through 1989 in the circuit courts of Utah and
in the Appeals court and in the other courts for the same reasons.
7.

Effective assitance of counsel was denied because the courts

are unofficial, and the attorney failed to file papers, prepare
for trial, subpoena witnesses or or use material provided him
by the defendant, Mr. Palmer.
8.

Due process of law is being denied petitioner because

Michael D. Zimmerman, I. Daniel Stewart, Gordon r. Hall, R. Paul
Van Dam, Edward T. Alter, Tom L. Allen, W. Val Oveson, Norman H.
Bangerter and the members elect of the Utah legislature all did
fail to file their required oaths of office within sixty days of
the commencement of their respective terms of office, and thus
all offices are vacant as a matter of lav/, and all appointments
7

made since the terms began are unofficial and all acts thereunder
are criminal violations of Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203.
For the foregoing reasons certiorari should be granted if
there were any provision of law that would allow for certiorari,
but there is not because the laws are void that were enacted to
provide for petitioning for writs of certiorari, thus due process
is denied to the defendant/petitioner and enforcement of the
void Salt Lake City Ordinance may well make the persons acting
to enforce the void ordinance liable under criminal and civil
violations of laws and rights of the accused, Mr, Bruce P. Palmer.
Dated this 29th Day of December 1989, A.D.

BRUCE P. PALMER
Petitioner Pro SE

Certificate of Service
I hereby certifiy that I mailed or hand
copies of the foregoing petition for writ of
to the office of The Salt Lake City Attorney
(200 EastSalt lake City, Utah on the 29th day

delivered four
certiorari
at 451 South
of December 1989.

Bruce P. Palmer
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FILED
NOV 291989
Clarke-t^Ccurt
U » h Ceurt *i Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO
Salt Lake City Corporation,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 880471-CA

Vo

Bruce P. Palmer,
Defendant and Appellant*

Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Rule 31 Hearing)
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.

DATED th is y_ L day oof November, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Greg ory K./Orate-; Judge

J

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Salt Lake City Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Bruce P. Palmer,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case NOe 880471-CA

PARTIES:
Bruce P. Palmer (Argued)
933 Pennsylvania Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Roger F. Cutler
Salt Lake City Attorney
Richard G. Hamp
Bruce Baird (Argued)
Assistant City Prosecutors
451 South 200 East, Suite 125
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
TRIAL JUDGE:
Honorable Floyd He Gowans
November 29, 1989. ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE.
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Rule 31
Hearing).
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE was deposited in
the United States mail or personally delivered to each of the above
parties.

y^/fc/ittf* ,.

Deputy C l e r k
/

TRIAL COURT:
Third C i r c u i t Court,

S a l t Lake D e p t . Nd\

881000374CM

RED LION BROADCASTING CO. v. FCC.

o^ 9

Syllabus.

RED LION BROADCASTING CO., INC., ET AL. V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO T H E UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 2. Argued April 2-^3, 1969.—Decided June 9, 1969.*
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has for many
years imposed on broadcasters a "fairness doctrine," requiring that
public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side of
those issues be given fair coverage. In No. 2, the FCC declared
that petitioner Red Lion Broadcasting Co. had failed to meet its
obligation under the fairness doctrine when it carried a program
which constituted a personal attack on one Cook, and ordered it to
send a transcript of the broadcast to Cook and provide reply time,
whether or not Cook would pay for it. The Court of Appeals
upheld the FCC's position. After the commencement of the
Red Lion litigation the FCC began a rule-making proceeding to
make the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more
precise and more readily enforceable, and to specify its rules
relating to political editorials. The rules, as adopted and amended,
were held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA
(No. 717), as abridging the freedoms of speech and press. Held:
1. The history of the fairness doctrine and of related legislation
shows that the FCC's action in the Red Lion case did not exceed
its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the FCC
was implementing congressional policy. Pp. 375-386.
(a) The fairness doctrine began shortly after the Federal
Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among
competing applicants in the public interest, and insofar as there
is an affirmative obligation of the broadcaster to see that both
sides are presented, the personal attack doctrine and regulations
do not differ from the fairness doctnne. Pp. 375-379
(b) The FCC's statutory mandate to see that broadcasters
operate in the public interest and Congress' reaffirmation, in the
•Together with No. 717, United States et al. v. Radio Television
News Directors Assn et al., on certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued April 3, 1969.

36#
•

J/C
p

OCTOBER TERM, 1968.
Syllabus.

395 U.S.

1959 amendment to §315 of the Communications Act, of the
FCC's view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest
standard, support the conclusion that the doctrine and its component personal attack and political editorializing reguh tions are
a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. Pp.
379-386.
2. The fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the
personal attack and political editorial rules do not violate the
First Amendment Pp. 386-401.
(a) The First Amendment is relevant to public broadcasting,
but it is the right of the viewing and listening public, and not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. Pp. 386-390.
(b) The First Amendment does not protect private censorship
by broadcasters who are licensed by the Government to use a
scarce resource which is denied to others. Pp. 390-392.
(c) The danger that licensees will eliminate coverage of controversial issues as a result of the personal attack and political
editorial rules is at best speculative, and, in any event, the FCC
has authonty to guard against this danger. Pp. 392«-395.
(d) There was nothing vague about the FCC's specific ruling
in the Red Lion case and the regulations at issue in fto. 717
could be employed in precisely the same way as the fairness doctrine in Red Lion. It is not necessary to decide every aspect of
the fairness doctrine to decide these cases. Problems involving
more extreme applications or more difficult constitutional questions
will be dealt with if and when they arise. Pp. 395-396.
(e) It has not been shown that the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, which impelled governmental regulation, is entirely a
thing of the past, as new uses for the frequency spectrum have
kept pace with unproved technology and more efficient utilization
of that spectrum. Pp. 396-400.
No. 2, 127 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 381 F. 2d 908, affirmed; No. 717,
400 F. 2d 1002, reversed and remanded.

Roger Rohb argued the cause for petitioners in No, 2.
With him on the brief were H. Donald Kistler and
Thomas B. Sweeney. Solicitor General Griswold argued
the cause for the United States and the Federal Communications Commission, petitioners in No. 717 and
respondents in No. 2. With him on the brief were
09
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Opinion of the Court.

Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor
General Springer, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Henry Geller,
and Daniel R. Ohlbaum.
Archibald Cox argued the cause for respondents in
No. 717. With him on the brief for respondents Radio
Television News Directors Assn. et al. were W. Theodore
Pierson, Harold David Cohen, Vernon C. Kohlhaas, and
/ . Laurent Scharff. On the brief for respondent National
Broadcasting Co.; Inc., were Lawrence J. McKay, Raymond L. Falls, Jr., Corydon B. Dunham, Howard Monderer, and Abraham P. Ordover. On the brief for
respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., were
Lloyd N. Cutler, /. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk,
Robert V. Evans, and Herbert Wechsler.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 717 and
affirmance in No. 2 were filed by Melvrn L. Wulj and
Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties
Union, and by Earle K. Moore and William B. Ball for
the Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ et al. / . Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas
E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of
Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations urging
reversal in No. 717.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Communications Commission has for
many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters
the requirement that discussion of public issues be
presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of
those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known
as the fairness doctrine, which originated very early in
the history of broadcasting and has maintained its present outlines for some time. It is an obligation whose
content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings
in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statu-

388

OCTOBER TERM, 1968.
Opinion of the Court.

395 U. 8.

incomparably greater than the range of the human voice
and the problem of interference is a massive reality*
The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many
from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by
radio at the same time if intelligible communication is
to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in
the present state of commercially acceptable technology.
It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from
permitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever
power level he wished, which made necessary the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications
Act of 1934,14 as the Court has noted at length before.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 XL S.
190, 210-214 (1943), It was this reality which at the
very least necessitated first the division of the radio
spectrum into portions reserved respectively for public
broadcasting and for other important radio uses such as
amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and navigation; and then the subdivision of each portion, and assignment of specific frequencies to individual users or groups
of users. Beyond this, however, because the frequencies
reserved for public broadcasting were limited in number,
it was essential for the Government to tell some applicants that they could not broadcast at all because there
was room for only a few.
Where there are substantially more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate,
it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual
to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broad1#

The range of controls *hich have in fact been imposed over
the last 40 years, without giving use to successful constitutional
challenge in this Court, is discussed in W Emery, Broadcasting and
Government: Responsibilities and Regulations (1961); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964).

04
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Opinion of the Court.

cast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate,
all of them may have the same "right" to a license;
but if there is to be any effective communication by
radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be
barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the
First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering
communications, prevented the Government from making
radio communication possible by requiring licenses to
broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as
not to overcrowd the spectrum.
This has been the consistent view of the Court. Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and deny
licenses and to eliminate existing stations. FRC v. Xelson
Bros. Bond it Mortgage Co., 2S9 U. S. 266 (1933). No
one has a First Amendment right to a license or to
monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license
because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial
of free speech." Xational Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U. S. 190. 227 (1943).
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment
is concerned those who are licensed stand no better
than those to whom licenses are refused. A license
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or
to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of
his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a liconsee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative oi his community and which would otherwise,
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrelevant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a
major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in
3 326, which forbids FCC interference with "the right

n
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OCTOBER TERM, 1968.
Opinion of the Court,

395 U. S.

of free speech by means of radio communication."
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees
in favor of others whose views should be expressed
on this unique medium. But the people as a whole
retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470,
475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349
U. S. 3.58, 361-362 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and
Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U. S. 1. 20 (1945); iXew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U. S. 254. 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S.
616, 630 (1919; (Holmes, J., dissenting). "[SJpeech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana. 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See Brennan, The
>\:>rrvne Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
F:>t Amendment. 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). It is the
fight of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
B.
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that
O
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each frequency should be shared among all or some of
those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion
of the broadcast day or the broadcast week. The ruling
and regulations at issue here do not go quite so far. They
assert that under specified circumstances, a licensee must
offer to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast
time to those who have a view different from that which
has already been expressed on his station. The expression of a political endorsement, or of a personal
attack while dealing with a controversial public issue,
simply triggers this time sharing. As we have said, the
First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent
others from broadcasting on "their" frequencies and no
right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource
which the Government has denied others the right to use.
In terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced
sharing of a scarce resource, the personal attack and
political editorial rules are indistinguishable from the
equal-time provision of § 315, a specific enactment of
Congress requiring stations to set aside reply time under
specified circumstances and to which the fairness doctrine
and these constituent regulations are important complements. That provision, which has been part of the
law since 1927. Radio Act of 1927, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170,
has been held valid by this Court as an obligation of the
licensee relieving him of any power in any way to prevent or censor the broadcast, and thus insulating him
from liability for defamation. The constitutionality of
the statute under the First Amendment was unquestioned.17 Farmers Educ. <£ Coop. Union v. WD AY, 360
U. S. 525 (1959).
17

This has not prevented vigorous argument from developing on
the constitutionality of the ancillary FCC doctrines. Compare
Barrow, The Equal Opportumnes and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. Cm. L. Rev. 447
(19GS), with Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obser-
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and the asbestos NESHAP regulations.
Defendants have also failed to comply with
the compliance orders issued to them by
EPA. The Government has established a
reasonable probability of success on the
merits, the likelihood of irreparable injury
if the asbestos in the hotel is not properly
disposed of, and that a balancing of hardships favors granting an injunction. Because it is so clearly in the public interest
to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants to secure the facility, properly
dispose of the ACM, and comply with
EPA's orders, the Government's motion is
granted.
J^\
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Kelly I VAN METER and Lauren J.
Van Meter, PiatntifTs,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF
MAPLEWOOD. Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 87-4677.
United States District Court,
D. New Jersey.
Oct. 13, 1988.
Homeowners brought action challenging ordinance which limited type of satellite
dish antenna which they could install on
their land. The District Court, Debevoise,
J., held that: (1) abstention was not required, and (2) ordinance reasonably restricted reception of authorized satellite
signals, and thus was preempted by Federal Communications Commission order regulating satellite dish antenna reception.
Judgment for plaintiffs.
1. Federal Courts <*^41
Abstention, in its various manifestations, is a prudential doctrine applied to
further comity, federalism, and judicial

economy; in certain limited circumstances,
federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction where state proceeding
involving the same dispute is pending.
2. Federal Courts «=»6€
Younger abstention did not apply to
federal civil rights suit challenging local
zoning ordinance regulating television antennas where municipality had agreed to
stay prosecution of ita municipal court complaint for zoning violations until resolution
of summary judgment motion in federal
court.
3. Federal Courts *=M1
Younger abstention did not apply to
any administrative remedy which might
have been available to federal court plaintiffs where no proceeding was pending before any administrative body.
4. Federal Courts *=»S£
Pullman abstention was not applicable
in federal civil rights suit brought by homeowners challenging ordinance regulating
television antennas where the ordinance
was clear and unmistakable on its face.
5. Civil Right* *=»13.9
Exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is not required before initiating
federal civil rights action. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983c
6. Civil Right* «=»13.4(1)
Congressional legalization of reception
of authorized satellite television signals
permitted homeowners to bring federal civil rights action against township whose zoning ordinance allegedly interfered with federal regulation of satellite television signal
reception. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Communications Act of 1934, § 705<a, b), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605<a, b).
7. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=»229
Exhaustion of remedies is inappropriate where administrative proceedings available to the plaintiffs are not adequate
forms for their federal claims and will not
materially advance resolution of federal
claims.
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8. Administrative

Law

and

Procedure

Exhaustion doctrine is inappropriate
where federal plaintiff faces state criminal
prosecution under state statute which he
challenges as racially invalid and where
state administrative body is without competence to resolve that claim.
9. Municipal Corporations <*=»53
States <8=»18.9
Federal regulation may preempt state
or local law if the agency intended to exercise exclusive authority in the area and the
agency is legally authorized to displace
state or local regulation.
10. Administrative Law and Procedure
<*~70!
Telecommunication* <s»443.20
Federal district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider whether
Federal Communications Commission exceeded its authority in issuing regulation
preempting state or local zoning with respect to satellite television antennas. Communications Act of 1934, § 405, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 405.
11. Zoning and Planning <s=M4
Ordinance limiting size and location of
satellite dish antennas was an attempt to
dimmish visual impact of antennas and
thus had clearly defined health, safety, or
aesthetic objective for purposes of FCC
order allowing certain types of state and
local regulation of those antennas.
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save ordinance, which placed an unreasonable restriction on single reception, from
preemption by Federal Communications
Commission order
Schenck, Price. Smith & King by W
James MacNaughton. Momstown, N-J., for
plaintiffs.
Scarpone & Edelson, P.A. by Irwin P.
Burzynski, Michael Edelson, Val Mandel,
Newark, NJ. f for defendant.
OPINION
DEBEVOISE, District Judge.
This case involves homeowners who installed an antenna to receive satellite televiaioa signals ui cemtravetvuaa. oC a local
zoning ordinance.
Plaintiff homeowners
claim that the ordinance is invalidated by
federal law
They seek nummary judgment on their claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief and attorney's fees. Defendant municipality cross-moves for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims and to amend its
answer to assert a defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Background

12. Zoning and Planning <c=M4
Ordinance limiting satellite dish antennas to six feet in diameter and to placement on the ground with proper screening
unreasonably interfered with recepuon in
area in which ten-foot dishes were required
for adequate reception and in which antennas needed an elevation alignment of 14
degrees above the horizon, and thus was
preempted by FCC order.

Plsmtiffs Kelly Van Meter and his wife
Lauren are residents of Maplewood. a
small, suburban community in northern
New Jersey. In late 1985. plaintiffs decided to purchase a satellite television receiveonly antenna, known as a "TVRO" or
"earth station", that would enable them to
receive television signals transmitted directly from satellites and view them on a
television monitor. After researching the
technology and consulting with a vendor,
plaintiffs purchased a TVRO "dish antenna", also known as a "parabolic antenna"
because of its shallow dish shape, at a cost
of $2500 installed. The plaintiffs' dish antenna is ten feet in diameter and composed
pnmanly of black anodized wire mesh.

13. Zoning and Planning <£=>14
Ordinance under which satellite dish
antenna users who could not achieve reception within constraints imposed by ordinance could apply for zoning variance
would not be satisfactory and would not

In December of 1987, plaintiffs' antenna
vendor performed a site survey of the Van
Meter property in order to determine the
optimal site for the placement of the diah
antenna. The results of the survey indicated that, given the characteristics of

1/
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plaintiffs' lot, the antenna would have to be
mounted on the roof to enable plaintiffs to
receive signals from all of the available
satellite television channels.
At the time o f their purchase, plaintiffs
were aware of a zoning ordinance enacted
by the Maplewood T o w n s h i p Committee
(the "Committee") that g o v e r n e d the installation of dish a n t e n n a s . T h e "Maplewood
Dish Antennae Zoning Ordinance" (the
"Ordinance") b e c a m e e f f e c t i v e June 6.
1985. A m o n g i t s provisions, the Ordinance
forbids the u s e of a dish antenna greater
than six feet in h e i g h t " m e a s u r e d at the
highest point of its outer circumference or
extension/* r e q u i r e s that the dish be placed
in the rear yard, e s t a b l i s h e s minimum setbacks from property lines and buildings
and requires t h a t the dish be "screened
from view . . . by e v e r g r e e n planting which
shall be at l e a s t six feet in height at the
tame of planting." (A c o m p l e t e copy of the
Ordinance is s e t o u t in the Appendix to this
Opinion).

SUPPLEMENT
5, 1987,
violation
dered to
on May
pending.

On May 24, 1986, plaintiffs wrote the
township construction official seeking a
variance from t h e Ordinance to allow them
to place the a n t e n n a on their g a r a g e roof.
The construction official. Robert Mittermaier. wrote the Van Meters on A p n l 1, 1986,
and informed t h e m that the placement they
proposed w a s "not acceptable" and denied
their "application for permission"' to erect a
dish antenna.
Plaintiffs a t t e m p t e d to appeal Mittenmaier's decision to the township's Board of
Zoning A d j u s t m e n t (the "Board"). They
allege that a l t h o u g h they complied with the
procedures for appeal as explained by Mittermaier. he rejected the application because notice of publication w a s not timely
served on the municipality. According to
plaintiffs, Mittermaier, and later the mayor
of the township, informed the plaintiffs
that an appeal t o the Board would be futile.
Defendant d i s p u t e s t h e s e allegations.
After learning of an order of the Federal
Communications C o m m i s s i o n ("FCC") that
plaintiffs believed permitted the installation of their a n t e n n a w i t h o u t regard to the
local Ordinance, plaintiffs installed the antenna on the roof of their house. On May

plaintiffs received a s u m m o n s for
of t h e Ordinance and were ora p p e a r before the municipal court
19, 1987. T h a t s u m m o n s is still

On N o v e m b e r 11, 1987, plaintiffs filed
this action u n d e r 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claiming that the Ordinance is preempted by
FCC r e g u l a t i o n and t h a t it violates their
First A m e n d m e n t rights to receive satellite
television s i g n a l s .
T h e y s e e k injunctive
and declaratory relief and ask for attorney's f e e s p u r s u a n t to 4 2 U.S.C. sec. 1988.
^4 bs tendon
[ 1 ] A l t h o u g h not raised directly as a
bar to this action by d e f e n d a n t , I m u s t first
address the i s s u e of abstention.
Abstention, in its v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , is a prudential doctrine applied to further comity,
federalism and judicial e c o n o m y . In certain limited c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a federal court
should a b s t a i n from e x e r c i s i n g its jurisdiction w h e r e a s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g involving the
s a m e d i s p u t e is pending, Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.CL 746, 27 L.Ed.2d
669 (1971); Williams
v. Red Bank Bo. of
Educ,
6 6 2 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.1981). where
allowing a s t a t e court to c o n s t r u e its challenged s t a t u t e could avoid the necessity of
reaching any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue.
Railroad
Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman
Co., 312
U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643. 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941),
or where the i s s u e i n v o l v e s a complex, comprehensive bo<iy of s t a t e regulation over an
area of traditionally local interest,
Burford
v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.CL 1098.
87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). A l t h o u g h abstention
reflects s e n s i t i v i t y to s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y , its
application is not the r e s u l t of mere deference but r e f l e c t s an accommodation between s t a t e and federal interests.
[ 2 ] The doctrine first announced in
Younger,
s u p r a , p r e v e n t s a federal court
from hearing a c a s e involving s t r o n g and
compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t s w h e r e a proceeding b e t w e e n the s a m e parties and involving
the s a m e i s s u e s is p e n d i n g in the state
courts.
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , a s u m m o n s
w a s issued to the plaintiffs for violation of
the Ordinance on M a y 7, 1986.
While
Younger- principles m i g h t arguably require
abstention in this i n s t a n c e , here defendant
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resolved before a federal question can be
states that "Maplewood . . . has agreed to
decided. The "relevant inquiry" under the
stay the prosecution of its Municipal Court
Pullman doctrine, as the Supreme Court
complaint against Van Meter until after
observed in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midplaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
decided." Because defendant has voluntar- kiff. 467 U.S. 229. 237, 104 S.Ct 2321, 2327,
81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) "ia not whether there
ily submitted to the jurisdiction of this
is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that
court, therefore, the values underlying
state courts might render adjudication of
Younger are not implicated and its prudenthe federal question unnecessary.' 9 Rathtial constraints do not apply. Ohio Civil
er, the question is whether the statue is of
Rights
Comm'n
v. Dayton
Christian
an uncertain nature and " 'obviously susSchools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626, 106 S.Ct.
ceptible of a limiting construction.' " /<£,
2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Brown
quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees
and
251 and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 391. 397 and n. 14,
Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S.
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). Pullman absten491, 500 n. 9. 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3184 n. 9, 82
tion is inappropriate here. The language
L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Ohio Bureau of Emof the Ordinance is clear and unmistakably
ployment
Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S.
471, 480, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1904. 52 L.Ed.2d on its face and no difficult area of state
law is presented for interpretation. More513 (1977).
over,
Pullman abstention is inappropriate
[3) Nor does Younger abstention apply
in
cases
involving a claim of preemption.
to any administrative remedy which may
Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181,
have been available to plaintiffs through
185 (3d Cir.1980).
the township's Board of Adjustment because no proceeding is pending before that
Exhaustion
of Administrative
Remedies
body. Plaintiffs twice attempted to obtain
a variance from the Board. Their first
I must next address defendant's claim
letter, requesting a "zoning variance hearthat plaintiffs' complaint should be dising at the next town meeting," was treated
missed for failure to exhaust administraas an "application for permission" to erect
tive remedies.
a dish antenna and "denied" by the town(5.61 Exhaustion of state administraship construction official who also informed
tive
remedies is not required before initiatplaintiffs of their right to appeal his deciing
an
action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.
sion to the Board. Plaintiff discussed the
Patsy v. Florida Bo. of Regents, 457 U.S.
notice requirements for a hearing applica496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982).
tion before the Board with the construction
A section 1983 action may be brought for
official and then completed and filed an
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges,
"Application for Hearing" and had a public
or immunities secured by the Constitution
notice of an appeal for a variance printed in
and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
the local newspaper. According to plainsec. 1983. Congress legalized the reception
tiffs' certification, however, the construcof authorized or unencrypted satellite teletion official refused to accept the applicavision signals under the Cable Communication because he claimed not to have retions Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act"),
ceived proof of publication in sufficient
as discussed at greater length below, and
time. Defendant does not claim that a
the FCC, in turn, issued the Order to minivariance application is now pending and it
mize interference with satellite television
is clear that the unappealed decision of a
reception. This permits plaintiffs to bring
municipal administrative official is not a
a Section 1983 action for interference with
pending proceeding within the meaning of
this federal scheme. Maine v. ThiboutoU
the Younger doctrine.
448 U.S. 1, 100 S.CL 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 655
[41 Pullman abstention requires a federal court to abstain when difficult and
unsettled questions of state law must be

(1980); see also, e.g.. Kennecott Corp., ru*
pro, 637 F.2d at 186 n. 5 (section 1983
action may be brought for federal statu-
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tory rights protected by Williams Act);
Pietroniro v. OceanporU 764 F.2d 976, 980
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106
S.Ct- 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985) ("In the
absence of a comprehensive enforcement
scheme within the regulatory scheme
*rhich encompasses plaintiffs8 complaint,"
there is a private cause of action through
section 1983 to redress state's failure to
provide housing relocation assistance under
Housing Act of 1949 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970). Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is therefore not a
t>ar to this action.
[7] Exhaustion of administrative remedies is further inappropriate in this instance because the administrative proceedings available to plaintiffs arc not adequate
forums for their federal claims and would
not materially advance the resolution of
this controversy. See, e.g.. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania
Team*
$tcr* Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295 (3d
Cir. 1982); Cerro Metal Prods, v. Marshall,
620 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980). The
Board's functions are narrowly limited to
technical matters involving review of decisions of administrative officers of the
Board, interpretations of zoning maps and
ordinances and the granting of variances.
See NJ.S.A. sec. 40:G5D-70. Its proceeding's are not bound by the rules of evidence. N-XS.A. Bee. 40:55D-10<e). Appeals from a Board decision may be taken
to the municipality's governing body, in
this case the township committee, only "if
permitted by [township] ordinance." N J .
ScA. sec. 40:55D-17(a). Even then, appeals
Are limited to the Board's decisions on special use variances. Id*; Nickerson v. Newark, 220 NJ.Super. 284, 531 A.2d 1095
(L.Div.1987). To require exhaustion of an
administrative process that is without competence to consider plaintiffs claims would
merely delay the ultimate resolution of this
dispute.
[ 8 ! Finally, invocation of the exhaustion
doctrine is also inappropriate where a federal plaintiff faces state criminal prosecution under a statute he challenges as facially invalid and where the state administra-

tive body is without competence to resolve
the tflaim. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 497 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 a. 5,
52 L>Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plaintiff facing quasi-criminal proceeding for violation of local
zoning ordinance not required to seek zoning variance).
Siiice I conclude that plaintiffs are not
required to exhaust administrative remedies, defendant's motion to amend its answer to assert this affirmative defense is
denied as futile.
The FCC Order
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Act")
amending the Communications Act of 1934.
The main thrust of this legislation is to
assure that the exploding market for cable
television technology provides the widest
possible diversity of information services to
the public. See House Committer on Energy a nd Commerce, Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, H.R.Rep. No. 80-934,
98th Cong., 2d Seas. 19, reprinted in part
in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
4655, 4656. Recognizing that cable suppliers often rely on encrypted satellite transmission feeds which they then distribute
through the cable distribution network to
home viewers, the Act also provided for
stiffened penalties for unauthorized satellite video users who intercept and decode
these "pirated" messages for private use.
See 47 U.S.C. 606<a). This provision also
contains a limited exception to liability for
direct reception of unencrypted and authorized reception of encrypted satellite television transmissions. Id* at sec. 605(h).
Congress apparently believed that unrestricted market forces embodied in the purchasing decisions made by individual consumers would be the best means of determining the viability of this information distribution technology. See 120 Cong.Rec.
S14.286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) reprinted
in 1984 U.S.Code
Cong. <& Admin.News, 4742, 4747.
Relying in part on the Cable Act's satellite television provisions, see 51 Fed.Reg.
5519, 5522 (1986), the FCC issued an Order
entitled "Preemption of local zoning of
earth stations," found at 47 C.F.R. sec.
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25.104. The Order provides, in relevant
part, that:
State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate between satellite
receive-only antennas and other types of
antenna facilities are preempted unless
such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception
of satellite delivered signals by receiveonly antennas or to impose costs on the
users of such antennas that are excessive in light of the purchase and installation cost of the equipment.
47 C.F.R. sec. 25.104.
Plaintiffs
assert
that
this
Order
preempts the Maplewood Ordinance.
Preemption of the
Ordinance
(91 A federal regulation may preempt
state or local law if (1) the agency intended
to exercise exclusive authority in the area
and (2) if the agency is legally authorized
to displace state or local regulation. New
York v. FCC
U.S.
.
,
108 S.CL 1637, 16-41-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 48
(TJ88). The intent of the FCC is clear on
the face of the Order which explicitly provides that local regulation inconsistent with
its requirements is preempted.

consider the issues. Meredith Corp. v.
FCC 809 F.2d 863 (D.C.Cir.1987); Peoria,
supra* 690 F.2d at 119. Thus defendant
may raise his arguments before the commission in a motion for a declaratory judgment, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.2, o r i n a petition for
repeal of the Order, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.401.
Judicial review may only then be sought
from the Court of Appeals. 47 U.S.C.
405<a); 23 U.S.C. sec. 2342(1). In the interests of judicial economy, I will assume
without deciding that the Order was a valid
exercise of authonty by the Commission
and proceed on to the balance of the preemption analysis. 1

(101 The second step of the New York
test and defendant's assertion that the FCC
exceeded its authonty present identical inquiries. This court, however, lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the question.
Before an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must have been given
the opportunity to reconsider its position.
47 U.S.C. sec. 405; Pcona v. General Elec.
Cablewsxon Corp, 61)0 F.2d 116. 121 (7th
Cir.1982). Although 47 U.S.C. sec. 405
specifies that a petition for reconsideration
must be filed within thirty days of the
Commission's decision, this provision has
been interpreted merely to provide the
Commission with a "fair opportunity" to
t.
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I note in passing thai ih« Supreme Court recently sustained (he FCCs authority to issue
regulations preempting local cable regulation
enacted in the wake of the Cable Act s passage.

The preemption issue presented here is
unusual because the federal regulation itself establishes standards that govern
whether and to what de^rre^ the local regulation is preempted.
The threshold determination under the
Order is whether the challenged regulation
differentiates between TVRO's and other
types of antenna facilities. The Ordinance
clearly applies to "dish antennae . . . or
satellite receiving stationfs]." Ordinance
sec. 2.1. It differentiates between TVRO
antennas and transmitting dish antennas
by forbidding the use of the latter entirely.
Id. at sec. 2.3. The Ordinance does not
apply to UHF and VHF television, FM radio, or ham and short-wave radio antennas.
Thus the Ordinance effectively discriminates between different types of antennas.
[ I l l The Order next provides that in
order to avoid preemption, the local regulation must have a reasonable, clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective.
The Ordinance passes this test. Satellite
dish antennas are large and rather unsightly. Although it does not state its purposes
explicitly, the Ordinance is clearly an attempt to diminish the visual impact of the
antennas by requiring that they be installed in the rear yard and, where they can be
viewed from the street or adjoining properties, requiring that the installation be
screened with tall shrubbery. Some safety
.V*w York v. FCC.

lb'
a a-£

U.S.

. 10S S.CL 1637.

100 L-EdJId 48 (1988). The Court did noi directly consider the FCC Order in question, however.
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purposes m i g h t also be achieved by preventing dish a n t e n n a roof placement and
by establishing h e i g h t limitations in order
to avoid the h a z a r d s of a fallen or windblown antenna.
Finally, the Ordinance also must not prevent or impose u n r e a s o n a b l e limitations on
reception or i m p o s e c o s t s on the user disproportionate t o his total investment in antenna equipment and installation. In order
to make this e v a l u a t i o n I m u s t first digress
to consider h o w satellite television signals
are received. I d r a w this explanation from
the undisputed affidavit submitted by
plaintiffs' T V R O v e n d o r and installer, the
article submitted by defendant, Harry B.
Roth, R e g u l a t i n g Satellite Dish Antennas,
American P l a n n i n g Association, Planning
Advisory Service Report No. 394, and the
discussion a c c o m p a n y i n g the release of the
FCC Order at 51 F e d . R e g . 5519 (1986) et
Nineteen s a t e l l i t e s in geostationary orbit
22,300 miles a b o v e the equator broadcast
programming s e r v i c e s that can be received
only by TVRO a n t e n n a s . These "television
satellites" are located above the eastern
Pacific and are .spaced four degrees apart
from each other. T h e TVRO remains in a
fixed poflition to receive signals from a
given satellite b u t is mounted on an electric
rotor that permits it to be realigned to
receive signals from the other satellites as
required.
In order for the TVRO antenna to receive satellite s i g n a l s , there must be a clear
line of sight b e t w e e n the satellite and the
dish antenna. D e n s e obstructions such as
buildings, t r e e s and shrubbery interfere
with or prohibit reception. The range of
unobstructed positions an antenna m u s t
have to "view" the satellites and receive
signals is called a "reception window" or
"look angle". This angle is expressed in
terms of two dimensions.
The azimuth
alignment, e x p r e s s e d in degrees from true
North, refers to the horizontal direction the
antenna must be directed. Since there are
a number of television satellites, this ts
expressed as a r a n g e . The elevation alignment refers to the vertical orientation,
usually e x p r e s s e d in d e g r e e s above the ho-

SUPPLEMENT
rizon.
In northern N e w J e r s e y , a look
angle with an azimuth alignment of 69 to
143 d e g r e e s W e s t and an elevation alignment of 14 d e g r e e s above the horizon is
required to receive signals from the television satellites.
Because satellite-transmitted television
signals are relatively weak, the dish antennas m u s t be a t l e a s t ten feet in l e n g t h in
this area of the country in order to receive
transmissions.
[ 1 2 ] Plaintiffs do not claim t h a t a rearlot installation would completely preclude
ail satellite reception; they claim, rather,
that they can receive "all" of the available
signals only by m o u n t i n g the dish antenna
on the roof of their house. The FCC Order
does not require the Ordinance to permit
optimal placement; it precludes only "unreasonable" interference with satellite signal reception. It is unclear w h e t h e r plaintiffs inability to receive "ail" of the satellite signals includes channels which are encrypted or which the plaintiffs are not otherwise authorized to receive.
Construing
ail facts in the light m o s t favorable to the
party o p p o s i n g s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , I cannot conclude, on the basis of this assertion
alone, that the regulation imposes an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs.
It is clear, h o w e v e r , that the Ordinance
functions as an unreasonable burden on
reception b e c a u s e its provisions make reception technically impossible and because
it is generally insensitive Lo the unique
conditions that g o v e r n signal reception on
any given site.
Although d e f e n d a n t does not dispute
that a ten-foot wide dish antenna is the
smallest size capable of receiving television
satellite reception in this area, the Ordinance m a k e s reception technically impossible by limiting the maximum height of any
part of the a n t e n n a installation to six feet.
A ten-foot wide dish antenna angled at the
required f o u r t e e n d e g r e e elevation, would
clearly e x c e e d this limitation.
The Ordinance is also insensitive to the
unique conditions that govern reception on
any given lot, The Ordinance requires the
antenna to be "screened from v i e w from
adjoining properties and streets by ever-
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green planting . . . at least six feet in
height at the time of planting." Ordinance
sec. 3.1. This standard is unreasonable
because it is insensitive to the impact of
shielding on an antenna's recepuon window. While vegetation surrounding a satellite installation can actually help improve
reception by absorbing interfering signals,
it can impair or limit reception if it obstructs the antenna's line of sight. If the
orientation of a specific lot requires a look
angle directed toward a rear-adjoining lot,
for example, the antenna would have to be
placed over ten feet behind the required
six-foot high evergreen screening, assuming a fourteen degree elevation azimuth, in
order to gain a clear "view" over the obstacle. Given the configuration of some
lots, this might well limit or completely
prevent reception. This type of regulation
was specifically disapproved by the FCC in
the statements accompanying its Order.
51 Fcd.Reg. 5519, 5524 (1986) ("(An ordinance] cannot unreasonably limit or prevent reception by requiring, for example,
that a receive-only antenna be screened so
that line of sight is obscured.").
In addition, if there were lots on either
aide of the roar yard, the TVRO user would
also have to shield the antenna from view
by the adjoining properties by planting
evergreen shielding on both sides. Thus, a
homeowner might have to plant thirty fet?t
of hedgerows six feet tall to comply with
the ordinance at a cost that could easily
exceed the initial investment in satellite
television reception equipment.
The Ordinance also unreasonably restricts reception by failing to provide options for alternative placement to TVRO
users who cannot receive signals or who
would receive only diminished recepuon
through rear lot installation. While roofmounting poses obvious aesthetic and safety problems, a per se prohibition of roof
installations, especially where the community interests in appearance and safety can
be satisfied at least in part, is an unreasonable limitation on reception within the
meaning of the Order.
(131 Defendant's proposed solution to
the antenna height limitation, which it con-

cedes to be an unreasonable limitation of
reception, is to allow TVRO users who cannot achieve recepuon within the constraints
imposed by the Ordinance to apply to the
Board of Adjustment for a zoning variance.
(This would presumably also be its response to the other unreasonable limitations I have found the statute imposes
upon recepuon). The defendant claims that
this scheme would effectively enable the
Board to apply the Ordinance in an individualized manner.
This scheme is unsatisfactory for several
reasons. First, while the concept of indi-'
vidualized treatment may be a worthy one,
variances from this Ordinance do not provide an effective means of achieving this
objective. 'A variance from a zoning ordinance is permitted only if "without substantial detriment to the public good" and
if it "will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zone plan and
zoning ordinance." NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D70. Apart from the very real question of
whether any variance from the challenged
Ordinance would remain consistent with its
specific purposes, this scheme is objecuonable because it does not include reasonable
satellite television signal reception as a
factor in the evaluation but considers uniy
the purposes of the ordinance and the
"public good".
Second, permitting the Board effectively
to regulate TVRO antenna placement by
Kranung variances from an invalidated ordinance would allow the Board to exercise
authority without bounds. No standards
for antenna placement would exist to guide
the decisions of the Board, to apprise
TVRO users of permitted placement sites,
or to provide a meaningful standard for
review of the Board's decisions. Nor could
the Board be guided directly by the FCC
Order since it was intended as a standard
for the preemption of local regulation, not
a model zoning ordinance. Permitting the
Board to regulate TVRO use in this manner would also increase the likelihood of
judicial intervention in a traditionally local
function, something that I would think that
the defendant would be loathe to encourage.
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Finally, the variance procedure, requiring TVRO antenna users to make an application for hearing, publish notice, serve
notice of publication and make a presentation at a public meeting, imposes burdens
other antenna users are not required to
bear and is therefore discriminatory within
the meaning of the Order. Since the process is not governed by consistent, objective standards, this variance process would
represent an unreasonable limitation on reception.
I am not unsympathetic to the difficult
task faced by municipalities that seek to
regulate dish antenna use in balancing the
community's aesthetic and safety interests
with the individual's interest in receiving
information transmitted through satellite
television signals The FCC, however, has
determined that when the community and
individual interests conflict in this context,
the interests of the individual and the national interest require that the balance be
tipped in favor of permitting individual satellite television reception
The task of
^Uiiiionmg appropriate legislation in light
of this mandate is not a simple one, but
municipalities can enact regulation consistent with the Order by regulating the use of
all antennas evenhandedly, without imposing special burdens on TVRO dish antenna
users, or by ensuring that their regulations
do not make reception technically impossible and are flexible enough to account for
the unique reception requirements of the
individual lots within their boundaries
Conclusion
For the reasons above. 1 conclude that,
assuming that the FCC had authority to
issue the Order, the Maplewood Ordinance
is preempted by 47 CFR 25.201. I thus
need not reach plaintiffs' constitutional
claimso
If the FCC Order is valid plaintiffs would
be entitled to summary judgment declaring
the Ordinance invalid, enjoining its enforcement and awarding plaintiffs attorney's
fees pursuant to 42 U S C sec. 1988 It
would follow that defendant's motion to
dismiss the preemption claim and for failure to spply for a variance should be denied on the merits and that defendant's

motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 should be
dismissed as moot.
However, defendant challenges the validity of the FCC Order, an issue I do not
have jurisdiction to decide. If within 45
days of October 11, 1988 defendant commences a proceeding challenging the Order
before the FCC and thereafter actively
prosecutes the proceeding, and if defendant
stays prosecution of plaintiffs and enforcement of the Ordinance against them, I shall
defer entering summary judgment against
defendant at this time and shall stay proceedings in this case until final disposition
of the proceeding challenging the validity
of the FCC Order Otherwise summary
judgment will be entered as described
above
Defendant should advise me by
October 31, 1988 what course of action it
proposes to take.
APPENDIX
MAPLEWOOD DISH ANTENNAE
ZONING ORDINANCE
There is hereby adopted an ordinance regulating the construction, placement, and use
of dish antennae within the Township of
Maplewood and supplementing and amending the zoning ordinance of the Township
of Maplewood regarding Accessory Building and Structures.
SECTION 1 ACCESSORY BUILDINGS
AND STRUCTURES
Section 1 1 An accessory building attached
to a principal building is considered part
of the principal building and shall adhere
to the yard requirements for the principal building.
Section 1.2: The distance from an accessory building to a principal building shall
not be less than 10 feet nor less than 6
feet from another accessory building or a
property line.
Section 1 3: The distance from an accessory building to a side property line shall
not be less than the side yard requirements of the principal budding.
SECTION 2 DISH ANTENNAE
Section 2 1. A receiving dish antennae (or
satellite receiving station) shall be considered an accessory structure.
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APPEN DIX—Continued
Section 2.2: A receiving diah antennae
shall be no more than 6 feet in height
measured at the highest point of its outer circumference or any extension, including the supporting structure.
It
shall be located in the rear yard only.
On corner lota, which have no defined
rear yard, it shall be located in a side
yard a minimum of two times the required front setback from the street line
measured at its closest point on its circumference, at any extension or to its
supporting structure, * whichever is closest.
Section 2.3: A transmitting dish antennae
is not a permitted use.
SECTION 3. BUFFERS FOR DTSH ANTENNAE
Section 3.1 A dish antennae [sic] shall be
screened from view from adjoining properties and streets by evergreen planting,
which shall be at least six feet in height
at the time of planting.

even grossly negligent withholding of any
material information from PTO.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Patent* «=»312(6)
Alleged infringer failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that inventors or their counsel were guilty of any
intentional or even grossly negligent withholding of any material information before
Patent and Trademark Office during prosecution or reexamination of patents disclosing ventricular defibrillation devices and,
thus, patents were not invalid for inequitable conduct before PTO.
Timothy J. Malloy, Lawrence M. Janns,
Gregory J. Vogier, Chicago, III.. Richard G.
Schneider, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Philip S. JohnHon, Albert W. Preston,
John J. Mackicwicz, Gary H. Levin, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
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ELI LILLY AND COMPANY. PUintifT.
v.
MEDTRONIC. INC.. Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 83-5393.
United States District Court,
E.D. Pennsylvania.
April 21, 1988.
Owner of patents disclosing ventricular defibrillation devices brought infringement action. On issue of whether patents
were unenforceable for inequitable conduct
before Patent and Trademark Office, the
District Court, Ditter, J., held that alleged
infringer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that inventors or their
counsel were guilty of any intentional or
I.

Or. Michel Mirowski Is the inventor of the 757
patent. Dr. Mirowski, Dr. Morton Mower, and

DITTER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Eli Lilly and Company brought
this suit against defendant Medtronic, Inc.
alleging infringement by Medtronic of two
United States patents. No. Re. 27,757, reexamined and issued as Bl Re. 27,757 (the 757
patent) and No. 3.942.536, reexamined and
issued as Bl 3.1)42,536 (the 536 patent). At
the close of Medtronic's ca*e, with the
agreement of the parties. I granted Lilly's
motion for a directed verdict with regard to
the validity of the 536 patent and its infringement by Medtronic's Model 7210 and
its associated leads. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Lilly, having found Medtronic's devices to infringe
the claims of the 757 patent. The jury also
decided that Medtronic's infringement of
the 757 and 536 patents was willful. The
parties agreed to submit for my determination the iaaue aa to whether the alleged
inequitable conduct of the patents' inventors,1 Dr. Michel Mirowski and Dr. Morton
Rollin H. Dennison, a Medtronic engineer, axe
listed a* the inventor* of the 536 patent.
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LAWRENCE REY TOPHAM
423 7th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah
April 14, 1989
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MR. Jeffery 0. Johnson:
When I was at the research center on April 10, 1989, I informed
you that I could not find the Oath of Office Certificates for
Norman H. Banger ter, W. Val Oveson, R. Paul Van Dam, Tom L.
Allen and Edward T. Alter for 1989. I also informed you that
I could not find in the same file any of the Oath of Office
Certificates for any of the members of the 1989 Utah Legislature.
I reported the absence of those records to Kathy Pickering who
spoke to Gordon R. Hall and Mr. Butler about their not being
on file at the Archives, I also reported it to David Hansen,
KSLf KTVX, Associated Press, The Deseret News, and the Sheriff's
office the same afternoon I met with you, Val Wilson and
Christie.

fe

As you suggested I am writing you for a written response to
this serious matter. Utah law provides that the Oath of Office
Vshall be filed in the Department of Archives. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended7~(^&=£r-^y says that all state officers
shall file their oath^of office in the Department of Archives.
F;
Utah Code Anno tat edJjS4—£-^) requires that to be done within sixty
ft J days or the office shall be declared vacant.
s

I was informed by Mr. Val Wilson at the research center that
the oaths of office not on file on April 10, 1989 in the Department of Archives for the five executive officers named above
were delivered to the Archives Department on April 11, 1989.
Christie told me that she received a hand full of Oath of Office
Certificates from a man she did not know on Tuesday, April 11,
1989, and that among them were the ones for Governor and Lt.
Governor among others she was unable to verify when I talked
to her on the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1989.
Under provisions of the Utah Criminal Code it is unlawful to
act in any public office without filing the required oath of
office. Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203 states the nature of the
offense. I would ask you to verify immediately in writing the
time, date and place those five Oath of Office Certificates
were filed and by whom they were delivered and received. A
Court document was filed on April 12, 1989 concerning the failure
to file the oaths of office for the five state executive
officers, your verification is needed.
I would also ask you
to verify the presence or absence of the oaths of office certificates for the members of the Utah Legislature and the time,
date and place of filing, and by whom delivered and by whom
received.
^LC^L* »C£^/}^^-xJatzA3''l'
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Lawrence Rey Topham

Is the state's
top officeholder
really official?
Gov. Norm Bangerter

SMP»9*B1

Saturday, April 15,1989

Elected officials
aren't official,
activist says
By Jay Evensen
Deseret News staff writer

TOPHAM
Continued from B1
State officials acted puzzled Friday when confronted with the
claims.
"The governor took the oath of office in January ... Remember?" said
Bud Scruggs, chief of staff to Gov.
Norm Bangerter.
Jeffery Johnson, state archives director, said he believes the law requires oaths of office to be filed only
for historical purposes. That law
does not include a time limit, he said.
But, since Topham began his crusade last week, all the oaths of office
from January have been placed on
file, Johnson said.
Meanwhile, state officials say the
public should rest assured that government is functioning normally and
that the results of November's election still stand.
"We have a video tape of the
swearing-in ceremony; the best proof
you-could have/1 said Lt. Gov. Val
Oveson.

B1

Just when state officials were getting used
to the jobs they were elected to last year,
along comes an activist who tells them they
really aren't in office.
Lawrence Topham, a constitutionalist who
once paid a candidate filing fee with silver
dollars worth far more than their face value,
says every state officeholder in Utah has broken the law by failing to file an oath of office
with the State Archives Division.
Topham, who once ran for governor as an
American Party candidate but was ousted
from that party after an internal dispute last
year, is linking that law with another one requiring elected officials to qualify for their
offices within 60 days of the start of their
terms.
In letters delivered to state officials this
week, he says every elected official, including
the governor, is no longer in office.
Please see TOPHAM on B6
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52-1-4

52-1-2. Bonds to state — Approval and recording — Filing
of oaths.
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless otherwise provided, shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives.

CHAPTER 2
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE
Section

62-2-L

Tin* in which to qualify — Failure
— Office declined vacant

52-2-1* Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office declared vacant
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or
any of its political subdivisions, tails to qualify for such office within sixty
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there217
EXHIBIT

"CC-3"
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PART 2
ABUSE OF OFFICE
Section
76-3-201.
76-8-202.
76-8-203.

Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acts or failure of duty.
Official misconduct — Unlawful acts
based on "inside'* information.
Unofficial misconduct.

76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acta or failure of duty.
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
if, with an intent to benefit himself or another or to
harm another, he knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purport* to be an act of his office, or
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed
on him by law or dearly inherent in the nature of his
office.
t973

76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct.
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions
of a public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required
oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has expired and the successor
has been elected or appointed and has qualified,
or alter (lis office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retainsfromhis
successor in office or other person entitled to the
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or
other writings appertaining or belonging to his
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the
same.
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor.
EXHIBIT "CC-4" /2.3
lf7S

I State of Utah
Department of Administrative Services

Division of Archives & Records Service
Norman H, Bangerter
Governor

Jeffery 0 Johnson
Director

State Capitol Archives Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801)538-3012

April 17, 1989

Lawrence Rey Topham
423 7th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Dear Mr. Topham:
In answer to your letter of April 14, the State Archives received the Oath of
Off tee Certificates
for Tom L. Allen, State Auditor; Edward T. Alter, State
Treasure; R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General; W. Val Oveson, Lt. Governor; and
Norrnan H. Bangerter, Governor on April 11. They are all dated January 2, 1989
and signed by Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court. We
have not received the Oaths from the 1989 Legislature.
If We can be of further service to you, please let us know.
Sincerely,

o
y 0. Johnson
Cc David D. Hansen, Lt. Governor's Office
c. Kirk Waldron
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CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

laftaUri** Htatary. For W-piiitirt bluory and
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99~M* 1114 U.1 Code Co«s and Adnt Mew*
p. H39.

I lit!,
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Library aWnrencna
Consumer Frotactioe a»30.
CJX Trade-Marka, Trndt-Nnmca and Unfair
Cooipctiuon | | 237. 231.

laterfertftct with the opermUo-ti 0/ a aatelllU

(a) Whoerer, without the tuthority of the aaUllite operator, bUntionaily or
maliooualy Interferes with the authorued operation of a commonicationa or weather
aatelliU or obetructi or hinder* any aateUite tranamitakm ahall be fined in accordance with thk title or impruorved not more than ten y *an or both.
(b) Thia tection does not prohibit any lawfully authorued inTeatigatiYe, protective,
or mtelbf ence activity of 1 law enforcement agency or of an intelligence agency of
the United State*.
(Addad P*b,L » « 0 € , TWt III. | 303(a). Ocl. H, int. 100 Sut 1871)
Laajaaladrt Hlntory. For lefulativt kiaxory tad
pnrnoac 0/ Nb.L 9*-50*. « 1916 U.1 Code
Coat tad Adra. New* p. 3535.

CHAPTER 67—MILITARY AND NAVY
I 13S2. Entering military. naraJ, or C**«t Guard property
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Nocca thereunder.
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bckf ordered not to enter, wbert defendant, vbo
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enter. U l *. WaJah, 0 . 9 (Am.) I9t3, T70
FJdl+HL

of attdenr aamaik 1711cm. U i v. Dorrcfl. CA.9
(Cat) 1913. 731 F-2d 427.
TWf aaction prokibidaf tint foug upon any
anbury reacrvation far toy pnrpoa* pronibitad by
lav require* that the initial entry be mad* far a
prohibited purpoae; that pronibitad pnrpoat nay
be the unauthorixnd entry faaeJf; foiaf upon a
anOitary baac witb kjaowladnt that aucb entry ia
nmrtnorund nooum tkia aactaom. U-l v. HaO,
GAAriiJ9M. 742 F^d 1133
7. ferine* arwnJnhad by law
Cor&mander'i reatnetion of entry under lawful
actbority waa aufftocnt to aantt ^prooibitad by
lav*requirementof often** of unlawful entry into
vulitary mttaflaftonu d defendant knew bai entry
wia BMutbortxnd U-l v. Cofbnr, CA.9 (Xlont)
1913. 739 FJd 76a
Defendant1! notms far entering mnon aallttary
faaataJQaoon art irnktmnt ia proaccubon far mentry of mibtaLry nuranation after bcinf rune»td or
ordemd to not immtw Vf orwnannnrlmf ofTkaer.
UJ. v. Bcnmi. D.CN.Y.19U, &Q FJKnptx » 7 .

SLUT** m*kjuf it nninwfni to reenter a aaiktary
Evidence wnt wufftcxBi to aupvoctfcocfirvtliv*t
baae arVr hana* bacn bnrrtd W tna rrnamaniliiii
defendant Inew lia entr?fentoKuLtmrv bvULfUm
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47 CFR Ch. I (10-1-37 Edition)

plaints regarding violations of equal
employment provisions of Federal,
State, Territorial, or local law shall
maintain for public Inspection, in the
same manner and in the same locations as required for the keeping and
posting of tariffs as set forth in 5 61.72
of this chapter, a file containing a
copy of each such report and copies of
all exhibits, letters, and other documents filed as part thereto, all correspondence between the permittee or licensee and the Commission pertaining
to the reports after they have been
filed and all documents incorporated
therein by reference.
(ii) Period of retention.
T h e documents specified in paragraph (f)(2)(i)
of this section shall be maintained for
a period of 2 years.

Sec
25 254 Computation of coordination distance contours for propagation modes
associated with precipitation scatter.
25.255 Guidelines for performing interference analyses for near great circle propagation mechanisms.
25.256 Guidelines for performing interference analyses for precipitation scatter
modes [Reserved]

[35 FR 12894, Aug. 14, 1970, as amended at
36 FR 3119. Feb. 18. 1971. Redesignated at
38 FR 22481, Aug. 21. 19731

Subpart H—Autnorfzation To Own Stock in the
Communications Satellite Corporation

PART 25—SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS

Subpart A—General

Sec.
25.101 Basis and scope.
25.102 [Reserved]
25.103 Definitions.
25.104 Preemption of local zoning of earth
stations.
Subpart i—Communication• Satellite
Procurement Regulations [Reserved]
Subpart C— Technical Standards

25 201 Definitions.
25 202 Frequencies, frequency tolerance
and emission limitations.
25 203 Choice of sites and frequencies.
25.204 Power limits.
25.205 Minimum angle of antenna elevation,
25.206 8tatlon Identification.
25 207 Cessation of emissions.
25.208 Power flux density limits.
25 209 Antenna performance standards.
25.251 Special requirements for coordination.
25.252 Maximum permissible Interference
power.
25.253 Determination of coordination distance for near great circle propagation
mechanisms.

Subpart D—[Reserved]
Subpart E—Applications and Authorizations

25 390 Developmental operation.
25.391 Qualifications of domestic satellite
space station licensees
25.392 Licensing provisions for the radlodetermlnation satellite service.
Subparts F-O—(Reserved]

25 501 Scope of this subpart.
25 502 Definitions
25 503-25 504 (Reserved]
25 505 Persons requiring authorization.
25 506-25 514 (Reserved]
25 515 Method of securing authorization.
25 516-25 519 (Reserved]
25 520 Contents of application.
25 521 Who may sign applications.
25 522 Full disclosures
25 523 Form of application, number of
copies, fees, etc.
25 524 (Reserved]
25.525 Action upon applications.
25 526 Amendments.
25 527 Defective applications.
25 528-25 529 (Reserved]
25 530 Scope of authorization.
25 531 Revocation of authorization.
EDITORIAL NOT* At 39 FR 33527, Sept 18.
1974. 'Earth Station" was corrected to read
"earth station" wherever It appeared in the
part.
Subpart A—General
AUTHORITY* Sees 101-404. 76 Stat. 419427; 47 U S C. 701-744.

9 25.101 Basis and scope.
(a) T h e rules and regulations In this
part are issued pursuant to the authority contained in section 2 0 1 ( c ) ( l l )
of the Communications Satellite Act
of 1962.
(b) T h e rules and regulations In this
psirt supplement, and are In addition
to the rules and regulations contained

^

Federal Communications Commission

§ 25.104

In or to be added to, other parts of this
chapter currently in force, or which
may subsequently be promulgated,
and which are applicable to matters
relating to communications by satellites.
[28 FR 13037, Dec. 5. 1963]
§25.102

[Reserved]

§25.103

Definitions.

(a) Communications
common carrier.
The
term
"communications
common carrier" as used in this part
means any person (individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
trust, corporation, or other entity) engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or fcrcisr^ communication
by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, including such carriers as are described
In subsection 2(b) (2) and (3) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, tod, in addition, for purposes of Subpart H of this part, includes any individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust.
corporation, or other entity which
owns or controls, directly or indirectly,
or is under direct or indirect common
control with, any such carrier.
(b) Authorized earner. (1) Except as
piovided in paragraph (b)(2) of this
section, the term "authorized carrier"
means a communications common carrier which is authorized by the Federal Communications Commission under
t h e Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, to provide sen-ices by means
of communications satellites.
(2) For the purposes of Subpart H of
this part, the term "authorized carrier" means a communications common
carrier which is specifically authorized
or which is a member of a class of carriers authorized by the Commission to
own shares of stock in the corporation.
(c) Communications
satellite corporation. (1) The terms "communications satellite corporation" or "corporation" as used in this part mean the
corporation created pursuant to the
provisions of Title III of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.
(2) The corporation shall be deemed
to be a common carrier within the
meaning of section 3(h) of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.

(d) Communication-satellite
earth
station complex. The term corrmunication-satellite earth station romplex
includes transmitters, receiver*, and
communications antennas at the earth
station site together with the interconnecting terrestrial facilities tables,
lines, or microwave facilitiss) and modulating and demodulating eqnoment
necessary for processing of traffic received from the terrestrial distribution
system(s) prior to transmission \ia satellite and of traffic received from the
satellite prior to transfer of channels
of communication to terrestrial distribution system(s).
(e) Communication-satellite
earth
station complex functions. The communication-satellite earth station complex interconnects with terminal
equipment of common carriers or authorized entities at the Interfax: accepts traffic from such entities at the
interface, processes for transmission
via satellite and performs the transmission function; receives traffic from
a satellite or satellites, processes it in a
form necessary to deliver channels of
communication to terrestrial comiron
carriers or such other authorized entities and delivers the processed traffic
to such entities at the interface
(f) Interface. The point of interconnection between two distinct but adjacent commu' ^ t i o n s systems having
different functions. The interface in
the communication-satellite sen ice is
that point where communications terminal equipment of the ter r rstrial
common carriers or other authorized
entities interconnects with the terminal equipment of the communicationsatellite earth station complex The
interface in the communication satellite service shall be located at the
earth station site, or if this is impracticable, as close thereto as po^siblr
(Sees. 4, 201. 303. 48 Stat. 1066. as amended.
76 Stat. 419. 48 Stat. 1082. as amended. 47
U S . C . 154. 721. 303)
(28 FR 13037, Dec. 5. 1963. as a m e n d e at 31
FR 3289. Mar. 2. 1966]
§25.104 Preemption
earth stations.

of

local

zoning

of

State and local zoning or other regulations that differentiate between satellite receive-only antennas and other
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47 CFR Ch. I (10-1-87 Edition)

types of antenna facilities are preempted unless such regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined health, safety or aesthetic objective: and
(b) Do not operate to Impose unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception of satellite delivered signals by
receive-only antennas or to Impose
costs on the users of such antennas
that are excessive In light of the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
Regulation of satellite transmitting
antennas is preempted In the same
manner except that state and local
health and safety regulation is not
preempted.
#
C51 FR 5526, Feb. 14, 1988]

(b) With one or more stations of the
same kind by means of one or more reflecting satellites or other objects In
space.
Fixed earth station. An earth station
intended to be used at a specified fixed
point
Fixed-satellite service. A radlocommunication service between Earth stations at specified fixed points when
one or more satellites are used; In
some cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links, which may also
be effected in the inter-satellite service: the fixed-satellite service may also
Include feeder links for other space radlocommunication services.
Geostationary satellite. A geosynchronous satellite whose circular and
direct orbit lies In the plane of the
Earth's equator and which thus reSubpart B— Communications Satolllt*
mains fixed relative to the Earth: by
Procurement Regulations [Reserved]
extension, a satellite which remains
approximately fixed relative to the
Subpart C—Technical Standards
Earth.
e
Inter-Satellite Service. A radlocomAUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 48 Stat. 1066, as
munication service providing links beamended; 47 U.S.C. 154. Interprets or ap- tween artificial earth satellites.
plies sec. 303, 48 Stat. 1082, as amended; 47
Mobile earth station. An earth staU.S.C. 303.
tion Intended to be used while In
Soulier 30 FR 7176, May 28, 1965. as
or during halts at unspecified
amended at 36 FR 2562. Feb.. 8, 1971, unless motion
points.
otherwise noted.
Passive satellite. An earth satellite
Intended to transmit radio communi925.201 Definitions.
Active satellite. An earth satellite cation signals by reflection.
Radiodetermination Satellite Servcarrying a station Intended to transmit
or re-transmit radlocommunication ice. A radlocommunication service for
the purpose -of radiodeterminatlon Insignals.
Coordination distance. For the pur- volving the use of one or more space
poses of this part, the expression "co- stations.
Satellite system. A space system
ordination distance" means the disusing
one or more artificial earth sattance from an earth station, within
which there Is a possibility of the use ellites.
Spacecraft A man-made vehicle
of a given transmitting frequency at
which
Is intended to go beyond the
this earth station causing harmful Interference to stations In the fixed or major portion of the Earth's atmosmobile service, sharing the same band, phere.
Space operation service. A radlocomor of the use of a given frequency for
reception at this earth station receiv- munication service concerned excluing harmful Interference from such sively with the operation of spacestations In the fixed or mobile service. craft, in particular space tracking,
Earth station. A station located space telemetry and space telecomeither on the Earth's surface or within mand. These functions will normally
the major portion of the Earth's at- be provided within the service In
mosphere Intended for communica- which the space station Is operating.
tion:
Space radiocommunication. Any ra(a) With one or more space stations; dlocommunication Involving the use of
one or more space stations or the use
or
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of one or more reflecting satellites or
other objects in space.
Space station, A station located on
an object which is beyond, is intended
to go beyond, or has been beyond, the
major portion of the Earths atmosphere.
Space system. Any group of cooperating earth stations and/or space stations employing space radiocommunication for specific purposes.
Space telecommand The use of radiocommunication for the transmission of signals to a space station to initiate, modify or terminate function of
the equipment on a space object, including the space station.
Space telemetering. The use of telemetering for the transmission from a
space station of results of measurements made in a spacecraft, including
those relating to the functioning of
the spacecraft.
Space tracking. Hetermination of
the orbit, velocity or instantaneous position of an "object in space by means
of radiodetermination, excluding primary radar, for the purpose of following the movement of the object.
Terrestrial
radiocommunication.
Any radiocommunication other than
space radiocommunication or radio astronomy.
Terrestrial station. A station effecting terrestrial radiocommunication.
[30 FR 7176, May 28, 1965, as amended at 36
FR 2562. Feb. 6, 1971; 48 FR 40254. Sept. 6.
1983; 51 FR 18445, May 20, 1986]
§ 25.202 \ Frequencies frequency tolerance
and'emission limitations.
(a)(1)Frequency bands. The following frequencies are available for use
by the fixed-satellite service. Precise
frequencies and bandwidths of emission will be assigned on a case-by-case
basis.

Sp«c#-to-€irm
37tXM200 MHi 1 ,
10.95-11.2 GHlS
11.45-11.7 GHz'i
11.7-12.2 GHi
17.7-197 GHx'
19.7-20.0 GHz

Etrttvto-*»c*
5925-6425 MHt»,
14 0-14 5 GHz.»,
27S-29 5GHZ.',
29 5-00 0 GHz.

1
TNt band m snamd coequafty wW> tarrwthtJ ndtoconv
rnurication torvtcti.

&f

* Us* of th»s band by m« fhrad-saWWa MTAC* is '•fiad to
international system^, . % other than <jom»stic *v«tarm
rnesa bands are also snarad on a co-aoua< tn«-i w**
•wmwtnal rad»ocornmur»'c.-!!>on services
'The band 14.0-M3 GHz « sh«/ed coequalty * f h (he
raoVxiav»gatton vrvx:** and the band U 4 - u « ''IWT *
shared with Govemm^oi terTestnal rad*ocommun^ca• en »erv
•ces »n acco^dsnc« with »he provrsions of footnote '..•':234 -n
the TaWe o* Frequency Allocation

(2) The following frequencies are
available for use by the Radio<i«Hermination Satellite Service:
1610-1626.5 MHz: Uscr-to-Satelllte Link
2483.5-2500 MHz: Satelllte-to-ttw Link
Fixed-Satellite service
frequencies
may be used for links between rad odetermination satellites and control centers, including the following sp»M ially
allocated bands, subject to the Rules
in this subpart:
5117-5183.0
MHz:
Satelltte-to-Control
Center Link
6525-6541.5 MHz: Control Center-tn-$atellite Link

(b) Other frequencies and associated
bandwidths of emission may b<» assigned on a case-by-case basis to space
systems under this part in conformance with § 2.106 of this chapter and
the Commission's rules and policies.
(c) Applicants, permittees and licensees of radio stations governed by this
part shall provide the Comrvssion
with all information it requires f or the
Advance Publication, coordination and
notification of frequency assignments
pursuant to the international Radio
RegulPtions and Article XIV of the
INTELSAT Agreement. This Information includes, but is not limitrd to,
that specified in Appendixes 3 and 4 of
the Radio Renuiations (Geneva 1979).
No protection from Interference
caused by radio stations authorize by
other Administrations is guaranteed
unless coordination procedures are
timely completed or, with respect to
individual administrations, by successfully completing coordination agreements. Any radio station authorization
for which coordination has not been
completed may be subject to additional terms and conditions as required to
effect coordination of the frequency
assignments with other Administrations.
(d) Orbital locations assigned to
space stations licensed under this part
by the Commission are subject to
change by summary order of the Com-
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS
rejected written offer. Mcndelson v. Roland
(1926) 66 U 487, 243 P 798.
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for
purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in

25-5-4

compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron
(1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745.
Collateral References,
Frauds, Statute of <£=> 71 et seq.
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq.
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq.. Statute of Frauds
J 59 et seq.

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement;
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry,
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator
or intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
Alteration or modification of original contract.
If original contract, to be binding and
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of
frauds, is required to be in writing and subscribed by parties sought to be charged, then
a subsequent agreement altering or modifying any of ita material parts or terms is also
required to be in writing and so subscribed,
no part performance or anything done by
such party in reliance on the subsequent
agreement being alleged or proved, especially
if interest in land is involved. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P
1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d
578.
Parties may modify orally an agreement in
writing where the original contract is not
required by statute of frauds to be in writing,
at least where there is consideration for such
modification. But a contract required by statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be modified by a subsequent oral agreement,
although this rule is subject to many exceptions, the first great division coming between
executory and executed modifications.
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc.
(1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on
rehearing 88 U 213. 53 P 2d 1153.
An oral modification of a contract required
to be in writing, when such modification "is
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 2467; L.
1909, ch. 72, §1; C.L. 1917. §5817; R.S. 1933
it C. 1943, 33-5-4.
Compiler'! Note*.
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws
1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §5 2835.
3918, 4219.
Affirmative defense.
When action is on contract, admitted by
defendant, he must interpose special plea of
statute if statute is to be available as
defense. Abba v, Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59
P756.
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
relying upon it as a defense. M A S Constr.
it Engineering Co. v Clearfield State Bank
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227
Defendant, who answered by a general
denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss
plaintiff's claim as being barred under
subset. (2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since under Rule 12(b). Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an
iffirmative defense under Rule 8<c). W. W &
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappaa (1970) 24 U 2d
264, 470 P 2d 252.
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UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT

61-1-1

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It ia unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
History: C. 1953, 61-M, enacted by L»
1963, ch. 145, { 1; L. 1963, ch, 284, I 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend*
ment made minor changes in phraseology,
punctuation and style.
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 61-M to
61-1-41 (L 1925, ch. 87, 55 1 to 10, 10x, 11 to
18, 20 to 27; 1927, ch. 59, § I; 1929, ch. 79, * l ;
R. S. 1933, 82-1-1 to 82-1-41; L. 1941 (1st S. S.),
ch. 29, n 1, 2; C. 1943, 82-1-1 to 82-1-41; L.
1957, en. 129, f 1; £9S£, en. 149, i £ J, refatin*;
to the state securities commission, were re*
pealed by Laws 1963, ch. 145,5 1 (see 61-1-30).

New H 6M-1 to 61-1-30 were enacted by f 1
of the act
Comparable Provision*. — Colo. Rev.
Stat H 11-51-101 to 11-51-129.
Idaho Code I 30-1401 et aeq.
Nev. Rev. Stat. H 90.010 to 90.205.
Wyo. Stat }* 17-4-101 to 17-4-129.
Croas-Roferencea, — Criminal Code, corporation frauds, \ 76-10-701 et aeq.
False or misleading statement! in filed documents unlawful, f 61-1-16.
Representation that registration constitutes
approval unlawful, h 61-1-17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Intent to defraud
Negligent preparation of financial statement.
Private action.
Purpose of act
Security classification.
Construction and application.
In riew of the severe penalties and serious
consequences imposed by the act for its violation, a particular transaction would not be held
in violation thereof unless it clearly and satisfactorily appeared to contravene the spirit and
letter of the law. Penalties and forfeitures
would not be implied or adjudged on doubtful
ground*. The statute, being penah "a* to he
strictly construed, end not extended by implication. Guaranty Mfg Co. v Wilcox, 62 Utah
1S4, 218 P. 133 (1923), Miller v. Stuart, 69
Utah 250, 253 P 900 (1927)
Intent to defraud.
A scheme to defraud need not come to fruition in order to constitute a crime under this
section; the offense 1* complete when a devic%,
scheme or artifice is used with intent to defraud. State v. Facer, 652 P.2d 110 (Utah
1976).

3 I
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Negligent preparation of ^nanrial state*
moot.
Lack of privity is not a defense where an
accountant ta aware that his work will be
relied on by parties who may extend credit to
his client or assume his client's obligations;
however, a future purchaser of stock of a corporation belongs to an unlimited claaa, and could
not be reasonably foreseen aa a third party who
would rely on a financial statement prepared
by the accountant. Milliner v. Elmer Fox &
Co., 529 P 2d 806 (Utah 1976).
Private action.
Although this statute makes certain practices unlawful, it does not provide for a right of
private action for its violation. Milliner v.
Elmer Fox k Co. 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1976).
Purpose of act.
The purpose of Utah's Blue Sky Law waa to
prevent fraud in the sale of securities and to
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person in charge may cause the person so removed to
be detained and delivered to the proper authorities
lm

7(5-10-1507. Exclusion of persons without bona
fide business from terminpl — Firearms and dangerous materials — Surveillance devices and seizure of offending material* — Detention of violators
— Private security per*onnrl.
(1) In order to provide for the safety, welfare and
comfort of passengers, a bus company may refuse admission to terminals to any person not having bona
fide business within the terminal Any such refusal
shall not be inconsistent or contrary to state or federal laws or regulations, or to any ordinance of the
political subdivision in which the terminal is located.
An authorized bus company representative may require any person in a terminal to identify himself and
state his business. Failure to comply with such request or to state an acceptable business purpose shall
be grounds for the representative to request that the
person depart the terminal. Any person who refuses
to comply with such a request shall be guilty of a
class C misdemeanor.
(2) Any person who carries a concealed dingerous
weapon, firearm, or any explosive, highly inflammable or hazardous materials or device* into a terminal
or aboard a bus shall be guilty of a third degree felony. The bus company may empfoy wxm&blc
means, including mechanical, electronic or x-ray devices to detect such items concealed in baggage or
upon the person of any pa««enger. Upon th* discovery
of any such item, the company may obtain poe**«^ion
and retain custody thereof until it is ti*n*ferreii to
law enforcement officers.
(3) An authorized bus company representative may
detain within a terminal or bus any person violating
the provisions of this act for a reasonable time until
law enforcement authorities arrive Such detention
shall not constitute unlawful imprisonment and neither the bus company nor the representative shall be
civilly or criminally liable upon ground* of unlawful
imprisonment or assault, provided that only reasonable and necessary force is exercised against any person so detained.
(4) A bus company may employ or contract for private security personnel Such personnel may detain
within a terminal or bus any person violating the
provisions of this act for a reasonable time until law
enforcement authorities arrive, and may use reasonable and necessary force in subduing or detaining anv
person violating this act.
ifrt
7&104508. Theft of baggage or cargo.
Any person who removes any baggage, cargo or
other item transported upon s bus or stored in a terminal without consent of the owner of the property or
the bus company, or its duly authorized representative is guilty of thefl and shall be punished pursuant
to Section 76-6-412.
in
?6-104509. Obstructing operation of bus.
Any person who unlawfully obstructs or impedes by
force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the
regular operation of a bus is guilty of a cla** C misdemeanor,
im
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus —
Conspiracy.
Two or more persons who willfulh or maliciousl}
Combine or conspire to violate Section 76-10-1509
Shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor
\m
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76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of a c t
The provisions of this act shall be cumulative and
supplemental to the provisions of any other law of the
state.
it?*
PART 18
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
Section
76-10-1601.
76-10-1S02
76-10-1603.
76-10-1603.5.

76-10-1604.
76-10-1605.

76-10-1606.
76-10-1607.
76-10-1608.
76-10-1609.

Short title
Definitions.
Unlawful acts.
Violation a felony — Costs — Forfeiture — Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution or reorganization — Restraining orders and
injunctions — Hearings —> Special
verdict — Findings — Judgment
and order of forfeiture — Seizure of
property — Sale — Proceeds — Petitions for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture —- Hearing — Disposition
Enforcement authority of peace officers.
Remedies of person injured by a pattern of unlawful activity — Double
damages —- Costs, including attor*
ney's fee — Arbitration — Agency
— Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general or county sttorney —
Dismissal — Statute of limitations
— Authorired orders of district
court.
Repealed.
Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding.
Severability clause
Prospective application.

76-10-1601. Short tide.
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act."
1SS7

76-10-1602, Definitions.
As used in this part:
U) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities
(2) Tattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise At
least one of the episodes comprising a pattern of
unlawful activity shall have occurred after July
31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part of
a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this
part shall have occurred within five years of the
commission of the next preceding act alleged as
pan of the pattern.
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in

CRIMINAL CODE
roperty, including state, county, and local govrnznental entities
(4) "Unlawful activity* means to directly enage in conduct or to solicit, request, command,
ncourage, or intentionally aid another person to
ngage in conduct which would constitute any
Sense described by the following crimes or estrones of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to enage in an act which would constitute any of
lose offenses, regardless of whether the act is in
i d charged or indicted by any authority or is
testified as a misdemeanor or a felony
(a) Assault or aggravated assault, Sections 76-5-102 and 76-5-103,
(b) A threat against life or property. Section 76-5-107;
(c) Criminal homicide, Sections 76-5-201,
76-5-202, and 76-5-203,
(d) Kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping.
Sections 76-5-301 and 76-5-302,
(e) Arson or aggravated arson. Sections
76-6-102 and 76-6-103,
(f) Causing a catastrophe. Section
76-6-105,
(g) Burglary or aggravated burglary, Sections 76-6-202 and 76-6-203,
(h) Burglary of a vehicle, Section
76-6-204;
(i) Manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or theR, Section 76-6-205,
(j) Robbery or aggravated robbery, Sections 76-6-301 and 76-6-302,
(k) Theft, Section 76-6-404,
(1) Theft by deception, Section 76-6-405,
(m) Theft by extortion, Section 76-6-406,
in) Receiving stolen property, Section
76-6-408,
(o) Theft of services, Section 76-6-409,
(p) Forgery, Section 76-6-501,
(q) Fraudulent use of a credit card, Sections 76-6-506 1, 76-6-506 2, and 76-6-506 4,
(r) Computer fraud. Part 7, Chapter 76,
Title 6,
(s) Bribery or receiving bribe by person in
the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods, Section 76-6-508.
(t) Bribery of a labor official. Section
76-6-509,
(u) Defrauding
creditors.
Section
76-6-511,
(v) Acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution. Section 76-6-512,
(w) Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, Section 76-6-513,
(z) Bribery or threat to influence contest.
Section 76-6-514,
(y) Making a false credit report, Section
76-6-517.
(z) Cnminal simulation. Section 76-6-518.
(as) Criminal usury. Section 76-6-520,
(bb) False or fraudulent insurance claim.
Section 76-6-521.
(cc) Sale o( a child. Section 76-7-203,
idd) Bribery to influence official or political actions, Section 76-8-103
(eel Threats to influence official or political action Section 76-8-104,
(ff) Receiving bribe or bribery b> public
servant. Section 76-8-105,
(ggl Receiving bnbe or bribery for endorsement of person as public servant, Sec-

76-10*1802

fhh) Official
misconduct.
Sections
76-8-201 and 76^-202,
(u) Obstructing justice. Section 76-8-306,
(JJ) Acceptance of bnbe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution. Section 76-8-308,
(kk> False or inconsistent material statements, Section 76-8-502.
(11) False or inconsistent statements, Section 76-8-503,
(mm) Written false statements, Section
76-8-504,
(no) Tampering with a witness, retaliation against a witness or informant, or bribery. Section 76-8-508.
(oo) Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding. Section 76-8-509,
(pp) Tampering with evidence, Section
76-8-510;
(qq) Intentionally or knowingly causing
one animal to fight with another, Subsection
76-9-301 (1) (0.
in) Delivery to common earner, mailing,
or placement on premises of an infernal machine, Section 76-10-307,
(as) Construction or possession of infernal
machine, Section 76-10-308,
(tt) Possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault. Section 76-10-507,
(uu) Unlawful marking of pistol or revolver. Section 76-10-521;
(w) Alteration of number or mark on pis*
tol or revolver. Section 76-10-522;
(ww) Forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade name, or trade device, Section
76-10-1002,
(xx) Selling goods under counterfeited
trademark, trade name, or trade devices,
Section 76-10-1003,
(yy) Sales in containers bearing registered
trademark of substituted articles, Section
76-10-1004,
(zz) Selling or dealing with article bearing
registered trademark or service mark With
intent to defraud. Section 76-10-1006,
(aaa) Gambling, Section 76-10-1102,
(bob) Gambling fraud. Section 76-10-1103,
(etc) Gambling
promotion.
Section
76-10-1104,
(ddd) Possessing s gambling device or
record. Section 76-10-1105
leee* Confidence
game.
Section
76-10-1109.
ifflD Distributing pornographic mstentl,
Section 76-10-1204
(ggg) Inducing acceptance of pornographic
material, Section 76-10-1205,
(hhh) Dealing in harmful materia! to I
minor, Section 76-10-1206,
(m) Distribution of pornographic films,
Section 76-10-1222,
(jD> Indecent public displays, Section
76-10-1228,
(kkk) Prostitution, Section 76-10-1302,
(111) Aiding
prostitution.
Section
76-10-1304
<mmm » Exploiting prostitution. Section
76-10-1305.
(nnn» Aggravated exploitation of prostit*
Hon, Section 76-10-1306,
(ooo) Sexual exploitation of a minor, Sa>
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(ppp) Communication* fraud. Section
76-10-1801;
(qqq) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 37, Title 53, the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b,
Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(rrr) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 1, Title 61, the Utah
Uniform Securities Act;
(sea) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 11, Title 57, the Land
and Timeahare Sales Practices Act;
(ttt) False claims for public assistance.
Section 62A-9-130;
(uuu) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63, the Utah
Procurement Code,
(vw) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of the laws governing taxation in
this state;
(www) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 12, Title 32av the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act;
(xxx) Any act prohibited by the criminal
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 13, the Recording Practices Act;
(yyy) Deceptive business practices, Section 76-6-507; and
(zzz) Any act illegal under the lawi of the
United States and enumerated in Title 18,
Section 1961 (1) (B), (C), and (D) of the
United States Code.
isea
76404603. Unlawful acta.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received
any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has participated as a principal, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the
proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern
of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It IB unlawful for any person to conspin to violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (31.
is*?
76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costs — For*
feiture — Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution or reorganization — Restraining orders and Injunctions «— Hearings — 8pecial verdict —
Findings — Judgment and order of
forfeiture — Seizure of property —
Sale — Proceeds — Petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hearing — Disposition.
(1) A person who violates any provision of Section
76-10-1603 is guilty of a second degree felony In addition to penalties prescribed by Isw, the court may
order the person found guilty of the felony to pay to
the state, if the attorney general brought the sction,
or to the county, if the county sttorney brought the
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action, the costs of investigating and prosecuting the
offense and the costs of securing the forfeitures provided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to
the state or the county:
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of any provision of Section 76-10-1603;
(b) any interest in* security of, claim against,
or property or contractural right of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise
which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct
of in violation of Section 76-10-1603; and
(c) any property constituting or derived from
any proceeds which the person obtained, directly
or indirectly, from the conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful activity or from any act or
conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation of any provision of Section 7640*1603
(2) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is baaed on a
pattern of unlawful activity consisting of acta or conduct in violation of Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to forfeiture under this section is limited to property, the
seizure or forfeiture of which would not constitute a
prior restraint on the ex erase of an affected party's
rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the
Utah Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the exercise of those n g h u
(3) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law for
a violation of Section 76-10-1603, a defendant who
derives profits or other proceeds from a conduct prohibited by Section 76-10-1603, may be fined not more
than twice the amount of the gross profits or other
proceeds
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to
criminal forfeiture under this section includes:
(a) real property, including things growing on,
affixed to, and found in land; and
(b) tangible and intangible personal property
including money, rights, privileges, interests,
claims, and securities of any kind;
(c> but does not include property legitimately
exchanged for services rendered in connection
with a defendants exercise of his rights under
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and the nght to appear and be defended by counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed by Article 1, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution
(5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of
Section 76-10-1603, and m addition to am penalty
prescribed by law and in addition to am forfeitures
provided for in this section, the court may do any or
all of the following*
(a) order the person to divest himself of any
interest in or any control, direct or indirect, of
any enterprise,
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future sctivities or investments of any person, including prohibiting the person from engaging in
the same type of endesvor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the Utah Constitution and
the Constitution of the United States permit; or
(c) order the dissolution or reorganization of
any enterprise
(6) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is baaed on a
pattern of unlswful activity consisting of acts or conduct in violstion or Section 76-10-1204. 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court ma> noi enter
any order that would amount to a pnor restraint on
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